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Financial Performance
of Selected
Microfinance
Institutions
Benchmarking Progress
to Sustainability
by Michael Tucker

Abstract: A few microfinance institutions (MFIs) have implemented
best business practices and made the transition to fully regulated financial institutions. Many more are in the process of undertaking this
transformation or at least considering it. Rising competition among
growing numbers of MFIs for both funding and clients has made
improved financial performance a necessity for most if not all MFIs.
Financial ratios of 17 Latin American MFIs are compared to benchmark performance ratios for the industry and with commercial Latin
American banks. This small sample of data, while useful, also underlines the need for more widespread MFI reporting. Complicating
reliance on financial comparisons is a complete lack of standardized
measures on how well the poor are being served.

Introduction
With initial and ongoing subsidization, microfinance institutions (MFIs) have been able to operate for years without too
much pressure to comply with the best or most profitable
operational strategies. An increase in competition and the
emergence of an ability to compare the financial performance
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of MFIs with each other and to benchmarks is beginning to
create greater concentration on improving business practices.
Realization that more efficient and financially sustainable
MFIs may also in the end lead to the assistance of a greater
number of the poor has served to link improving business practices with social mission. A shift in defining that social mission
may, however, be underway at some institutions as profits
grow in importance. Measuring and comparing the performance of MFIs has been difficult due to both a lack of publicly
available financial information and differences in reporting in
a mostly nonregulated industry. Data used in this overview has
been limited but it does indicate movement toward some standardization and the emergence of the ability to make benchmark comparisons.

Financial Sustainabilty
As more of MFI financing has come in the form of loans at
below market interest rates instead of outright grants, the
providers of low interest loans have found that their fiduciary
responsibilities necessitated greater scrutiny of the financial
practices of recipients. Even for NGOs still providing outright
grants, the task of determining which MFI to fund becomes
more of a business decision as the number of MFIs has grown.
Social goals may be more efficiently and effectively met by
MFIs familiar with best business practices as well as willing to
adhere to free market norms of making their operations transparent to would-be lenders or donors. In the absence of standardized, well-reported indicators of how well MFIs serve the
poor, the only measures available are financial ratios.
Michael Tucker is a Professor of Finance at Fairfield University in Fairfield
Connecticut. He has consulted with microﬁnance institutions in Haiti and Nicaragua,
has worked with small business start-ups in both countries, and is one of the founders
of Fairﬁeld University’s Center for Microﬁnance Advising and Consulting (CMAC).
His publications have appeared in many journals, including Ecological Economics,
Financial Review, Journal of Futures Markets, and Journal of Multinational
Financial Management. Tucker@fair1.fairﬁeld.edu
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If an MFI is examined by a competent auditor verifying the
accuracy of financial information, it is then possible to compare its performance with that of other MFIs. Benchmarks as a
means of comparing how well individual MFIs are functioning
within their peer groups is a useful tool for MFI management
and potential lenders or investors. The MicroBanking Bulletin
and MicroRate in conjunction with other organizations provide comparisons on a variety of ratios across regions of the
world as well as categories of MFIs. These benchmarks are a
means of comparing the performance of MFIs on their ability
to use funds efficiently. Whether or not targeted clientele are
funded has not been as clearly a focus of data gathering, though
at least the level of poverty of clients can be deduced from the
size of the average loan.
Not all MFIs may want to publicly reveal their financial
data, particularly those that are less efficient or perhaps less
capable of complying with reporting standards. There is a
reluctance to supply data to create and expand a benchmark
reporting system that is in its infancy. This reluctance to participate by the vast majority of MFIs means that the data that
is reported is skewed toward more successful and usually larger
MFIs. Larger MFIs with better financial performance and/or
more accurate record keeping would likely be more motivated
to respond to data gathering. The September 2000
MicroBanking Bulletin (Calmeadow, 2000) had data from only
114 institutions out of several thousand. Among the missing
MFIs is the very large Grameen Bank with over 2.5 million
clients. Only 23 out of the 114 that did report were willing to
release their individual figures on a disaggregated basis to the
public. A considerable number of those institutions were regulated and already legally required to release their financial figures.
Incremental costs in time and money to comply with
reporting requirements are likely one barrier to reporting.
Another is the lack of requisite data maintenance and administrative skills. One way that low participation rates might be
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addressed would be for NGOs to compel the participation of
their client MFIs. Since most NGOs that either loan or provide
grants to MFIs usually require periodic audits, it would seem
to be a fairly straightforward step to insist that client MFIs
report data to independent rating or data compilation services
in order to be eligible for funding. Greater transparency would
create a more open market for funding allocation, enabling the
most efficient MFIs to survive. A danger in this strategy is that
the social mission could be compromised. Serving the poorest
is more expensive than servicing the poor or the near poor. At
the very least, making available demographics of the client base
along with financial performance would allow either for data
gathering groups to make adjustments to take the poverty of
those served into account or for NGOs to make their own allocation decisions with a full complement of information. It may
also be possible for institutions not seeking financial sustainability to take the initiative to develop a different set of benchmarks derived from social audit data. This standardized data
would assist NGOs in allocating funding to MFIs that more
clearly meet their goals.

Competition
Competition for grant and loan funds has increased as the
number of MFIs has steadily grown. A more recent form of
competition has been the pursuit of clients. This coincides
with the growth in the number of MFIs. Attracting clients
involves marketing to their needs rather than simply distributing money to the next customer.
Somewhat taken for granted as an inexhaustible resource,
clients were seen as readily available if the MFI had the funds
to loan. In an economic environment where MFIs were few,
they did not compete with each other but rather allocated territory and/or clients if more than one MFI was in the same
geographical area. With the profusion of MFIs this type of collusion is no longer viable and may even be construed as illegal
in countries seeking more open markets. As MFIs strive to
110
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become financially sustainable, market share is increasingly
important. For profit making businesses, gaining market share
has been the most certain route to economies of scale while
simultaneously overcoming the competition. In the MFI
world, this can be accomplished by attracting more clients,
increasing the size of average loans, or both.
With the entry of banks as lenders to the poor as well as
MFIs making the transition to regulated financial institutions,
interest rate competition to attract clients and profits to lure
investors are important operating considerations. In 1995 the
poor in Latin America were virtually ignored by regulated
entities who obtained nearly 100% of their credit from nonregulated MFIs. By 2000, 53% of clients who would have been
customers of unregulated MFI are now customers of regulated
MFIs or banks (Christen, 2001). In that interim period several
MFIs made the transformation into regulated institutions or
banks, taking their clients with them. PRODEM in Bolivia
became Banco Sol and took on more expensive unsubsidized
credit from banks. The size of Banco Sol’s average loan
increased, reflecting an attempt to become more cost efficient.
A new lending requirement was also instituted that mandated
borrowers would not be eligible for loans unless they were in
business for one year or longer (Cerven, Ghazanfar, and
Source, 1999).
The average loans made by regulated MFIs in Latin
America are greater than loans made by unregulated institutions: $803 for regulated MFIs versus $322 for unregulated
MFIs (Christen, 2001). Larger loans made to more prosperous
clients in an effort to achieve cost effective operations support
the notion that mission drift is occurring; i.e., the original goal
of service to the poorest may be undergoing a transformation
by a very real need to become both financially sustainable and
competitive. Lending small amounts of money is time and cost
intensive. The cost of a loan to a first-time borrower, including
attracting that borrower, has been estimated to be from $55 to

Volume 3 Number 2

111

final 3/2

9/11/02

11:46 AM

Page 112

Journal of Microfinance

$237 for Latin American MFIs (Gheen, Jaramillo, and
Pazmino, 1999).
Increasingly banks have recognized the possibility of profits in microfinance and have expanded their retail services to
include lending to the poor (Baydas, Graham, and Valenzuela,
1997). Individual MFIs are faced with competitive pressure
from above coming from banks expanding into their markets
seeking their better clients. Competition from below for the
poorer clients is coming from new or expanding MFIs. In the
third quarter of 1999, 163% of the Bolivian MFI market had
been reached (Christen, 2001). The only explanation is that
market saturation has led some borrowers to borrow from
more than one MFI. Competition on both quality of service
and the cost of delivering that service are major factors in some
MFI markets. A shakeout of less efficient MFIs is underway.
Those that survive are likely to be the ones that are more client
centered.
In Nicaragua MFI interest rates are typically 30% to 40%,
considerably higher than commercial bank rates of less than
17%. In 2001, an election year, a new law was passed mandating that MFIs charge rates no higher than those of commercial
banks. Regulated financial services are not constrained by the
interest rate ceiling, obviating the need in Nicaragua for MFIs
to become more efficient where possible, compete for more
prosperous clients and more seriously seek to become regulated financial institutions (personal communication with F.
Barquero, consultant to Wisconsin Coordinating Council of
on Nicaraugua, 2001). A key requirement of a regulated financial institution is that it must demonstrate the ability to earn a
profit. Regulated financial institutions must also meet timely
reporting requirements, use acceptable accounting practices,
and are submit to periodic audits. These are all difficult goals
for fledgling MFIs that may lack the personnel to achieve
them. Technology can assist to some extent.
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Technology
Servicing ever increasing numbers of clients demands more
sophisticated management information systems (MIS). Many
MFIs have struggled with outdated software, often locally
made without documentation or adequate support. Acquiring
software to run a larger organization can be expensive—one of
the more highly rated software packages, SIEM, is priced from
$2,000 to $20,000 (CGAP, 2001). Keeping hardware up-to-date
and training expenses increase the outlay. In addition, the need
for more highly skilled personnel raises the salary base. In a
competitive market, failing to obtain such software can be the
equivalent of surrendering market share to the competition.
Clients that do not receive timely approvals and updates have
the freedom to take their borrowing needs elsewhere. NGOs
that are unable to verify what the MFI is doing because of poor
reporting may cut off funding.
The introduction of smartcards, a credit card with an
embedded microprocessor, represents an effort to both facilitate customer service and streamline record keeping. Loan officers can update accounts in the field when visiting clients
through smartcard readers and either directly transmit transactions to a central computer or gather data to be efficiently and
accurately entered into the system at a later time. Individual
loan officers can attend to more clients and provide information to them more quickly. Using this technology involves
additional costs but differentiates an MFI from its competitors.
Palm pilots are also being used in the field to electronically
process loan applications and in some cases provide applicants
with virtually instantaneous approval through programmed
credit scoring and a series of pertinent questions. While these
innovations are not currently widespread, their availability
and potential to have a major competitive impact makes their
introduction more likely.
Field staff compensation accounts for 50% to 70% of
administrative costs (Gibbons and Meehan, 2000). A minimum
target clientele for each loan officer is 300 borrowers. Both
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smartcards and palm pilots increase the efficiency of loan officers and can reduce administrative costs. Achieving a positive
return on the sizeable initial investment required to introduce
these technologies necessitates a large client base and a requisite level of sophistication of employees. Larger MFIs already
having achieved some economies of scale and sufficient funding
to invest in more sophisticated technology will pressure competitors to do the same even as they find it necessary to continuously upgrade.
Collecting and maintaining records electronically can
improve the accuracy of record keeping, but without the ability to compare overall aggregated institutional performance
with other MFIs an individual MFI is less aware of areas in
need of improvement. Ideally an MFI should be able to compare its performance not only with other MFIs but with
acknowledged leaders. In the developed world continuous
improvement is closely linked with benchmarking performance to those companies or institutions identified as the best.
Industry or institutional leaders that have adopted the best
practices and achieved superior performance make that performance public. Institutions that fall short of the best know that
their performance will be compared to leaders in the industry.
The microfinance industry is beginning to establish benchmark comparisons—industry levels that all MFIs should strive
to attain.

Benchmark Ratios
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and MicroRate
solicited and obtained financial information from 17 MFIs in
Latin American to compile benchmark financial ratios for the
Latin American area. Of these 17, 9 were regulated institutions
and 8 were not. The MFIs ranged from BancoSol in Bolivia
with nearly $75 million in outstanding loans to FINCA in
Nicaragua with a $935,000 loan portfolio (Jansson and
Taborga, 2000). Table 1 shows the results of the survey, including IDB/MicroRate recommended benchmarks gleaned from
114
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MFI Benchmark Nonregulated MFIs (8) Regulated MFIs(9) Comm'l Banks
n/a
0.20%
0.80%
2-5%
ROA (adjusted)
1.20%
3%
12.10%
4-8%
ROA (unadjusted)
n/a
-3.90%
-3%
10-15%
ROA (adjusted)
6.90%
19.90%
21.30%
20-30%
ROA (unadjusted)
n/a
21.50%
31.50%
20-30%
Gross Fin'l Margin (adjusted)
5.50%
20.10%
39.70%
25-35%
Gross Fin'l Margin (unadjusted)
10.2:1
5.3:1
0.9:1
3:1 to 8:1
Debt/Equity
26.62%
23.70%
86%
25-35%
Equity/Gross Portfolio
1.16%*
4.40%
4.70%
1-3%
Portfolio at Risk (>30 overdue)
228.3%*
163.40%
104.30%
75-125%
Loan Loss Reserves/Loans>30 days overdue
n/a
0.30%
0.60%
<2%
Write-offs/Avg Gross Portfolio
28.90%
14.50%
18.30%
10-25%
Cash & Mktble Securities/Total Assets
48.50%
80.30%
75.50%
Gross Loan Portfolio/Total Assets
70-90%
608
n/a
>300
280
Loans per Credit Officer
n/a
$91,000
$220,000
Gross Portfolio per Credit Officer
$200,000-$400,000
15.20%
8.90%
>15%
28.10%
Optg Expenses/Average Assets
18.70%
38.90%
19.80%
>20%
Optg Expenses/Average Gross Loan Portfolio
$157
n/a
$87
>$125
Optg Expenses/Average Number of Loans
19.40%
17.90%
19.10%
>15%
Growth of Total Assets
26.80%
17%
24.60%
>15%
Growth of Gross Portfolio
41.50%
21.80%
44.20%
20-40%
Growth of Equity
n/a
$957
$356
n/a
Average Loan Size
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the best performers among the 17 institutions, performance on
the same ratios obtained from the nine regulated MFIs and the
eight nonregulated MFIs, and ratios of commercial banks from
Latin America and the Caribbean. Adjustments were made to
audited data to account for differences between countries.
Gross financial margin, return on assets (ROA), and return on
equity (ROE) are ratios subject to distortion because of sources
of funding, i.e., outright grants or subsidized loans. A separate
calculation is provided that adjusts data used to compile these
ratios by removing subsidies. Target benchmarks were also calculated based upon the measures of the better performing MFIs
in the group of 17.
Unadjusted return on assets (ROA) and return on equity
(ROE) for the MFIs are considerably greater than adjusted
measures, reflecting that on average these MFIs still receive
substantial subsidies. Removal of the subsidies to produce
adjusted data shows borderline financial sustainability. The
averages are also below benchmarks set by the better performing cohort. Individual MFI goals may vary but since nine of
these MFIs are already regulated and many of the remaining
eight aspire to become regulated entities, performance levels
approaching the MFI benchmarks are more appropriate to
both attaining and maintaining regulated status. MFIs that are
borderline performers are likely to be judged as more risky by
any institution or NGO providing funding, which can either
result in denial of funding or the imposition of higher interest
rates on that funding.
Gross financial margin, returns on assets exclusive of nonfinancial operating expenses, needs to be high since MFIs typically have high operating expenses that need to be covered with
those returns. Charging high interest and maintaining near perfect collection policies can be key to surviving. Both adjusted
and unadjusted gross financial margins are high for the MFIs
and well above that obtained by the commercial banks. The
ability of commercial banks to succeed with lower gross financial margins may be due to the economies of scale possible at
116
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larger institutions. Greater utilization of technology could
lower nonfinancial operating costs and enable MFIs to lower
interest rates on loans. There would still be the greater risk
involved in making loans that are not collateralized to less educated borrowers in need of greater servicing. This would still
entail the maintenance of higher gross financial margins than
commercial banks.
Commercial banks do show their economies of scale by
widely outperforming MFIs on operating expenses as a percentage of assets. Regulated MFIs in turn achieve economies of
scale superior to unregulated MFIs as shown by their operating
expenses to assets ratio of 15.2% vs. 28.1% for nonregulated
institutions and operating expenses to total loan portfolio of
19.8% vs. 38.9%. Regulated MFIs incur greater operating
expenses per loan, $157 vs. $87 for nonregulated institutions,
but again this is overshadowed by the $957 average loan vs.
$356 for nonregulated MFIs.
The debt-to-equity ratio of nonregulated MFIs is below
1.0, indicating either an inability or a reluctance to use leverage to finance operations and expand loan portfolios.
Regulated MFIs have an average D/E ratio half as great as the
commercial banks. Access to capital markets is certainly an
issue for MFIs. Regulated MFIs with better reporting and the
security of government oversight would have better access to
capital markets for funding but may pay higher rates than commercial banks. Nonregulated MFIs would depend more on
NGO financing, often subsidized and outright equity, which is
why their D/E ratio is so low. Equity as a percentage of gross
portfolio is also quite high for nonregulated MFIs, again
reflecting predominately equity sources of financing and
thereby constraining potential growth. Regulated MFIs are
quite close to commercial banks on this measure.
Portfolio at risk (PAR) is comparable between both groups
of MFIs, averaging over 4% in both cases, and above the high
range of the recommended benchmark of 3%. Commercial
banks at 1.16% are performing comparably even better than
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this low ratio indicates because their PAR represents loans
overdue by 90 days vs. 30 days for MFIs. Different reporting
standards on PAR can make comparisons difficult. One version of this ratio is calculated as (gross loans outstanding overdue more than 30 days)/(total loan portfolio). This measure
does not take into account distortions that arise from including new loans that have not been outstanding for over 30 days
in the denominator, thus biasing this ratio downward to a performance better than might actually be occurring. The downward bias can be more substantial in newer MFIs with more
rapidly growing portfolios and larger proportions of their
portfolios loaned out in the past 30 days. Using an adjusted
ratio calculated as (gross loans outstanding overdue more than
30 days)/(total loan portfolio outstanding more than 30 days)
provides a clearer picture of portfolio performance
(Rosenberg, 1999). Standardizing reporting of PAR to this
measure would enhance comparability.
Nonregulated MFIs have lower loan loss reserves than regulated MFIs and commercial banks, though still within the recommended benchmark. The use of an aging schedule to arrive
at loan loss reserves, i.e., weighting overdue loans by the probability of collection multiplied by days outstanding, can vary
across institutions. Regulated institutions would be required to
adhere to more standardized guidelines. Nonregulated MFIs
are also motivated and able to dress up their income statements
by minimizing loan loss reserves in order to continue to have
access to NGO capital.
Timing is everything when it comes to calculating writeoffs as a percentage of a portfolio outstanding. Some institutions may prefer to carry nonperforming loans on the books,
viewing write-offs as negative performance indicators. This tactic instead creates higher PAR, a negative indicator. MFIs in
the survey were all below the 2% benchmark. Both regulated
and unregulated MFIs were surprisingly low: 0.30% and 0.60%
respectively. The practice of refinancing nonperforming loans
to avoid writing them off could also be a factor.
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Liquidity as measured by cash and marketable securities as
a percentage of total assets should not be above or below the
benchmark performance band of 10% to 25%. Too much liquidity means assets are not being loaned out, and too little
places the institution in danger of failing to meet pending
obligations. Commercial banks are the most conservative of
the three groups, with liquidity above the levels recommended
for MFIs. One explanation for this is that commercial banks
have demand deposits, which are somewhat unpredictable
obligations necessitating greater liquidity. Deposits are typically missing from the asset mix of most MFIs. Commercial
banks are also more conservative in lending out their assets
that is reflected in the 48.5% gross loans to total assets, percentage, much below that of the MFIs. Again, this is likely a
function of the need to service depositors as well as more
investments in fixed assets such as buildings.
There is a large distinction in operating performance as
measured by loans serviced per credit officer. Nonregulated
MFIs are just below the benchmark of 300 while regulated MFI
credit officers serviced 608 loans in 1998. Superior efficiency of
regulated MFIs may be in part due to multiple loans to the
same borrower as well as better technology support. Gross
loans per credit officer are also considerably greater for regulated MFIs ($220,000) as compared to nonregulated MFIs
($91,000), that is partially explained by more loans per officer
but also amplified by the smaller average nonregulated MFI
loan of $356 vs. the regulated MFI average of $957.
Nonregulated institutions with lower base figures against
which to measure growth exceed regulated MFIs in both
growth in assets, growth in portfolio, and growth in equity.
Interestingly, commercial banks also exceed regulated MFIs on
all three measures and are roughly equivalent to nonregulated
MFIs on all three indicators. With a larger base from which to
grow, a superior growth rate may reflect the ability of commercial banks to better participate in an overall economic
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expansion by loaning directly to larger businesses or the government.
This is a small sample of MFIs from Latin America. The
MicroBanking Bulletin has a larger global sample, but unlike
the study presented by IDB and MicoRate, there is no attempt
to define benchmarks but rather averages. These are also informative except for the fact that here too there is a dearth of data
on individual institutions, just 23 from all countries versus the
IDB and MicroRate study of 17 just from Latin America. It is
a start to bringing some comparability to a fledgling industry
making a transition from charitable recipients to real businesses. In order for the transition to continue and to succeed,
more data with which to make comparisons is needed.
Likewise, it will be necessary to devise some across-the-board
measures that report the degree to which social mission is
accomplished. Without these additional measures, differentiating MFIs from commercial banks on any measure other than
financial is a difficult task.
Establishing benchmark financial performance targets is a
viable goal. MFI reporting of data is essential for the analysis,
understanding, and dissemination of practical suggestions on
how to attain those benchmarks. Databases representing different kinds of institutions from diverse geographic areas will
enable the creation of different benchmarks applicable to varying situations. Social performance can be taken into account in
comparing benchmarks if and only if standardized measures
are employed and reported across institutions. It will be to all
participants’ benefit and even more so to the benefit of potential clients to systematize reporting and make data public.

Conclusion
Comparisons with benchmarks can alert management and
those that fund MFIs to how well or poorly an MFI is performing. By revealing weaknesses, benchmark measures can be
used as a guide to focus resources and upgrade management
practices. The best MFIs achieve superior performance by
120
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employing superior business practices. MFIs at the lower end
of the performance scale may have management less familiar
with superior or even standard business practices, such as using
management information systems to the greatest advantage,
projecting future cash flows, and planning. These basic practices done well are certainly requirements of a high performing
MFI.
To reach a level of operational excellence required to
become a financially self-sufficient MFI requires well-trained,
honest, and motivated management. But personnel skilled in
business may be difficult to attract and retain in a developing
country where such skills are in short supply and are well
rewarded in the profit sector of the economy. This is a
dilemma that can only partially be remedied by finding people
sufficiently dedicated to be willing to reject higher compensation because of a dedication to serving the poor.
Becoming a regulated institution with concomitant access
to capital markets is the goal of many unregulated MFIs.
Meeting regulatory requirements entails reaching financial selfsufficiency. Achieving profitability may mean increasing the
size of loans in order to focus more on profits. Service to the
poorest that borrow small sums at considerable expense to an
MFI may decline. In the IDB study Latin America’s regulated
MFIs had much higher average loans than those that were not
regulated.
The initial vision of Grameen to provide the poorest an
entry point into the economy with loans instead of handouts
has inspired the creation of thousands of MFIs worldwide.
Instead of the initial poor clients eventually taking their business to banks as they prospered, Grameen and other MFIs have
found that becoming banks or quasi-banks is an effective strategy for retaining clientele and reaching financial self-sufficiency. The MFIs not making the transition face the more
daunting task of surviving while serving the remaining poorest
who may not in the aggregate be able to use loaned funds as
effectively and efficiently as previous borrowers. These MFIs
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that are less likely to attain financial sustainability need to
develop a standardized set of benchmarks that demonstrate
their attainment of their mission of servicing the poorest of the
poor. Measures derived from social audits would be the most
likely source of such benchmarks.
Competition among MFIs will inevitably lead to failures,
possibly consolidation, and also service concentrating on specialized market niches such as the more difficult niche of the
poorest of the poor. Donors and investors will need to carefully examine their own goals and differentiate among the
available MFIs, particularly when deciding on subsidies or outright grants. Comparisons with benchmarks will be useful for
all MFIs. A different way of sorting out the MFIs by mission
rather than region and size alone may be necessary for those
providing funding to make the most appropriate decisions.
Transparency and availability of quality data is crucial to
making informed decisions. The thousands of MFIs that report
only to those that provide funding make the trickle of publicly
available data less representative. Those failing to report publicly are probably the least efficient. When they do seek funding and present their performance figures to NGOs they may
end up being compared with the more efficient reporting
MFIs, making it increasingly difficult for them to obtain funding. Perhaps this is just another way that an ongoing process of
eliminating the weakest performers will move forward.
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